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This report briefly examines the interplay between the European security
strategic vision and capabilities, its institutional architecture and policy
implementation practices, with a particular focus on the EU consular affairs,
EU democracy promotion and EU engagement in frozen conflicts under the
Neighbourhood Policy (Appendices 1-3).
This report contends that in order for the EU to develop an effective and
sustainable global security strategy, it first, has to reconcile the vision of its
strategic priorities within its inter- and intra-institutional settings. Second,
a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security,
which does not only focus on the internal dimensions of the EU Security
strategy (capabilities), but also equally draws on its external aspects –
a genuinely inclusive approach that would blur internal and external dimensions
of security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-
building process (especially of strategic partnership) is needed. Finally, while
legitimation of the new security vision is essential within the EU, a greater
emphasis should be placed on its external environment, which must not only
include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy instruments as suggested by
the EEAs, but more essentially, their connection with the interests and needs of
third parties. Case-studies in appendices elaborate further on some specific
aspects of the EU security within the eastern neighbourhood context.
1 A summary of  this policy paper was published as written evidence
by the House of  Lords as part of  the Call for Evidence ‘The Strategic
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SETTING THE SCENE: FROM
FRAGMENTED TO A MORE INTEGRATED
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
In summary, the EESS was strategically focused on
the EU’s external aspects of  security. It was context-
laden and particularly relevant to a specific time
period promoting narrowly defined multilateralism
and strategic partnerships. This precipitated a
review of  the EU security strategy in 2008, in an
attempt to balance out its strategic priorities, which
the next section addresses.
European (Internal) Security Strategy
2010 (EISS)
The 2010 ESS focused more exclusively on the
internal aspects of  the ESS, with the purpose to
strengthen the EU operational capacity, and develop
‘a larger consensus on the vision, values and
objectives which underpin EU security’ (2010:7).
It identified three strategic objectives:
• Protecting people in Europe as part of  the global
response
• Addressing global threats: including terrorism,
organised crime, cybercrime, cross-border crime,
violence, and natural and man-made disasters
• Developing a European Security Model (ESM)
consisting of  common tools; cooperation and
solidarity between Member States (MS) and all
EU institutions; and recognising ‘a greater
interdependence between internal and external
security’ (Ibid: 12).
Ten Action Guidelines were envisaged for the
implementation of  EU internal security strategy:
• a wider and more comprehensive approach to
facilitate horizontal and vertical cooperation
synergies;
• more effective democratic control and judicial
supervision of  security activities;
• a more proactive and intelligence-led approach –
for prevention and anticipation of  conflicts
• a more comprehensive model for information
exchange
• more operational cooperation, involving effective
coordination by COSI of  law-enforcement and
border-management authorities and EU agencies
• more cooperation in judicial matters
• better integrated border management
• commitment to innovation and training
• more cooperation with third countries, based on
‘mutual interest, concerns and possibilities’
(Ibid:29)
• more flexibility to adapt to future challenges
2 Corresponding author. We wish to thank Professor Richard
Whitman for his feedback on the earlier draft of  this paper
3 Sustainable partnerships when defined, should account for the
interests and needs of  participating sides to avoid breakdown of
communication as in the case of  EU-Russia relations in 2014 and
EU-China relations in early 2000s
The overview below explores the opportunities and
gaps in the EU security thinking in the process of
fostering an effective, sustainable and legitimate
European Global Security Strategy (EGSS) (June
2016). In particular, sections 1.1-1.3 highlight a rather
fragmented inter-institutional vision of EU security
strategy and its priorities, underscoring the need for
(i) a more integrated understanding of the external
and internal aspects of EU security; (ii) a more
comprehensive inter-institutional architecture and its
objectives; and (iii) more reflective external approach,
with an emphasis on strategic partnerships. These
three priorities are subsequently evaluated in sections
2-4, and conclude with general and specific
recommendations relating to EU consular affairs, EU
democracy promotion and EU conflict approach
under the ENP/EaP in the appendices.
European (External) Security Strategy
2003 (EESS)
The 2003 ESS of  2003 was explicitly externally
facing, underlying the importance of  developing a
uniform response (’effective multilateralism’) to
global challenges – ‘No single country is able to
tackle today’s complex problems on its own
(2003:1)’ – and the need to enhance the EU’s
presence and leadership in the global governance
system.
Three particular objectives were recognised as
strategically important:
• Addressing global threats: including terrorism,
proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction,
regional conflicts, organised crime, and state
failure
• Building security in the neighbourhood – to
‘promote a ring of  well governed countries, with
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative
relations’ (Ibid:8)
• Fostering effective multilateralism – ‘a rule-based
international order’ (Ibid:9) – by developing closer
cooperation with WTO, NATO, OSCE and regional
organisations (ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and African
Union)
Four Action Guidelines were envisaged for the
implementation of  the EU’s external security
strategy:
• a more active approach to realising EU strategic
objectives;
• developing more capabilities especially via EU-
NATO cooperation;
• more coherent alignment of  the EU Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP);
• and a more open approach to strategic
partnership-building
The EU has considerably progressed in fostering a common vision for the
European Security Strategy. It moved beyond the national priorities of
individual Member States to collectively consider the interests of the European
Union (EU) as a whole, and to separately articulate its external (2003) and
internal (2010) security priorities. At the same time, more challenging tasks still
lie ahead relating to (i) the facilitation of a joined-up vision,merging external
and internal dimensions of security; (ii) the development of a joined-up inter-
institutional approach involving all Members States and EU institutions, and
connecting policy instruments and geographical silos into a European Security
Model (ESM); and (iii) the fostering of sustainable partnerships (including of
strategic interest) with regional and global actors.3 If successful, this would
enable the EU to extend its security impact well beyond its borders, and to move
closer to its aspiration to become a global (rather than regional) security player.
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The report suggests that this could be achieved by
way of  fostering:
• a joined-up approach which would (i) connect the
above policy instruments ‘not only in conflicts and
crises, but across all fields of  EU external action’
(Ibid:20), and (ii) overcome geographical silos,
and vertical and horizontal inter- and intra-
institutional divisions;
• a sharper definition of  ‘strategic partnerships’ for
maximising the EU’s global influence (Ibid: 15).
This call for reflection, however, instead of
synergising the internal and external dimensions of
security, shifts the emphasis back on to the latter
(the external aspect of  EU security), and the
development of  capabilities, which would not
succeed without a proper partnership-building
approach and the EU’s decentring from its own
agenda. Global (and a more comprehensive) vision
is effectively missing from the discussion.
In summary, the above overview of  the EU strategic
objectives and actions explicitly highlights the
following ‘disconnects’ in the EU’ security thinking:
• there is a definitive need to develop an integrated
approach to European security which would
merge the external and internal aspects into a
comprehensive and global strategy;
• there is an urgent need for a joined-up approach,
which would draw on cross-institutional, cross-
governmental and cross-policy thematic
perspectives – for the purpose of  building a
comprehensive EU security model, which could
be applied across the board;
• there is urgency to understand and connect with
the EU external environment, especially by way of
defining the meaning of  partnerships (including
of  strategic interest), and developing greater
awareness about the recipient side.
We will explore and offer recommendations for each
of  the three priorities below.
1 Towards a comprehensive and
global strategy (Member States and
EU institutions)
While a joined-up strategy is envisaged for the
developed of  the EGSS, across institutions,
government agencies and thematic policies, there is
no integrated vision and understanding between the
main EU institutions as to how to achieve this
objective and drive it forward.
The European Council is tasked by the treaties to
offer a strategic direction for the EU’s development,
especially at the time of  crises. While realising the
importance of  developing a ‘common,
comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy’,
it nevertheless narrows its concerns to the
capability-building initiatives (by way of
empowering COSI to coordinate and monitor
implementation actions) and to renewing the EISS
for 2015-20, with a particular responsibility for
fostering systematic EU defence cooperation,
mobilising EU instruments, ensuring sufficient
defence budget in support of  EU defence actions
and monitoring the progress of  implementation of
Internal Security strategy (9798/15; JAI442: 10-11).
The external dimension of  security is circumscribed
to an area of  intensifying partnerships with the UN,
NATO, OSCE and AU (EUCO 22/15:5-6), the kind of
multilateralism which so far has not proved effective.
This ‘micro-management’ and selective
multilateralism (while ignoring new and emergent
regional and global players – BRICS, Eurasian
Union etc), may hinder EU leverage, and hamper its
positioning (2020+) as a global leader.
The EEAS has offered an apt and reflective report
outlining the need to radically rethink the EU’s security
strategy. It believes that traditional multilateralism is no
longer responsive to the new challenges, and the EU
needs a more inclusive strategy forward. At the same
time, the report shows a limited understanding, on the
one hand, of how the synergies between the external
Furthermore, two specific operational steps were
prioritised, which remit and rationale, however,
caused much contention at the national level of
Member States (Home Office 8293/15, 2015):
1 the development of  the operational capacity of
COSI – Standing Committee on Operational
Cooperation on Internal Security;
2 the establishment of  an internal security fund to
promote the implementation of  EISS.
In summary, this EISS focussed exclusively on
developing internal capabilities and institutions to
improve the strategy’s implementation practices.
Consequently, this excessive emphasis on internal
instruments, capacities and agencies brought about
more inter-institutional fragmentation and conflict of
interests than the desired unity of  response and
coordinated action.
Towards a European (Global) Security
Strategy 2015/16 (EGSS)
The EU currently finds itself  in the process of
reflection and development of  a new ESS, this time
aiming to foster an integrated (cross-institutional and
cross-thematic) global vision on European security.
Not only is it driven by a changing global
environment, which has become more inter-
connected, more complex and more contested
(EEAS 2015), the process also involves much-
needed reflection of  (i) possible synergies between
external and internal aspects of  security, (ii) existing
incoherence between the multitude of  instruments
and agencies; and (iii) the limited leverage over the
external environment, which prevents the EU to
punch its weight and act a global effective player
(Ibid: 1-2).
The High Representative’s (HR) report (EEAS 2015)
offers a comprehensive overview of  the achieved,
and also outlines the challenges ahead. Notably, it
identifies five specific geographic regions – a
broader European neighbourhood (Western
Balkans, EaP region, and Turkey), MENA, Africa,
Atlantic partnerships and Asia – where it believes
the EU could make a difference, and should treat
these regions as its priority. To do so, it requires the
EU’s external action instruments to be fit for purpose
and have:
• more direction and strategic vision
• more flexibility
• more coordination
• more leverage and
• more capabilities
At the same time, while acknowledging the
availability of  multiple instruments and policies
(Ibid:14-15) – ie CFSP, CSDP, counter-terrorism (CT),
cyber issues, humanitarian assistance, trade,
migration policy, climate policy, ENP and
enlargement – the HR’s report underscores the need
not for their proliferation, but rather, for their more
effective, better integrated and coordinated use.
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While the Council believes that empowering COSI
should be a priority, to facilitate its closer
cooperation with the Commission, EEAS and JHA
agencies; its remit and capability are seriously
questioned by the European and national agencies.
The Commission, on the other hand, insists on
empowering EU delegations and their better
integration into decision-making processes in
Brussels. The EEAS, conversely, is more concerned
with a top-down re-building of  the cross-sectoral
architecture of  the external action policies, which
may cause further intra- and inter-institutional
tensions. Consequently, an institutional re-mapping
may require further institutional changes involving
greater discretion and leadership by the EEAS, if  a
genuine ‘joined-up approach to all EU fields of  EU
external action’ were to be forged.
Overall, there is no vision or understanding of  what
the ESM should be, institutionally and thematically,
and whether (and how) it should pursue an all-
encompassing security style over the targeted set of
policy priorities.
In relation to the individual thematic policies –
enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CT
and Security and defence – the EEAS calls for the
dismantlement of  policy and geographical silos. At
the same time, the conclusions of  the inter-
parliamentary conference (September 2015)
suggest that a more differentiated approach to
individual policy’s contents and objectives should be
the priority.
The best way forward would be indeed to prioritise
individual policies – the ENP, migration, trade, border
management and energy – with the view to expand
their impact and connectivity, before considering
blurring their operational and geographical silos. For
more detailed overview and suggestion see
Appendix 1 on the EU strategic role in consular
affairs; Appendix 2 – on EU relations with
Azerbaijan; and Appendix 3 – on EU approach to
frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
3 Towards more effective and
sustainable Strategic Partnerships
To enable the successful development and
implementation of  the EGSS, the EU needs to
radically rethink the meaning of  ‘partnership’
(including of  strategic interest). While the notion of
partnership has been extensively used in the EU
external discourse, it avails no proper meaning.4 As
one EU senior official commented: ‘It is true the EU
has an evolving meaning of  “partnership”. The EU
has developed strategic partnerships and special
relations with substantial partners, whom the EU
takes seriously... whereas, [for example] partnership
under the ENP is [aimed] for smaller countries.’5 This
differentiation also infers whether partnership-
building should be driven by mutual interests (as in
strategic partnerships) or solely by EU norms
(known as conditionality approach). As practice
shows, even if  it is driven by reciprocity in strategic
partnerships, the EU tends to dominate and behave
as a norm-maker, in trying to ‘socialise’ its partners
into the EU’s way of  thinking.6 This is problematic as
it violates the very nature of  partnership, and
prevents the EU from learning about its external
environment, as EU-Russian relations have recently
attested to.
Recommendations
Premised on the above analysis, the following
general recommendations could be made:
• First, in order for the EU to develop an effective
and sustainable global security strategy, it has to
reconcile its vision and understanding of  strategic
priorities within its inter- and intra-institutional
settings, which would involve more coordination
from the EEAS
• Second, a serious effort is required to develop an
integrated view on European security, which will
not only focus on the internal dimensions of  EU
Security model, but will equally or even to a
greater extent, consider the external aspects of
security – a genuine inclusive approach that
would blur internal and external dimensions of
security. For this to succeed a deeper
understanding of  a partnership-building process
(especially of  strategic partnership) is needed.
• Finally, while legitimation of  the new security
vision is essential within the EU (by way of
security consultative forums), the emphasis
should also be placed on its external
environment, which will not only include a cross-
cutting approach to multiple policy dimensions,
but more essentially, their connection with the
interests and needs of  the third parties. Case-
studies in appendices offer some specific
recommendation on selected aspects of  EU
security vis-à-vis the eastern neighbourhood: the
EU’s role in consular affairs, democracy
promotion and engagement in frozen conflicts.
and internal dimensions of security could be
achieved (still placing more salience on the internal
aspects of security); and on the other, how to foster a
joined-up approach to overcome ‘horizontal and
vertical silos which hamper the EU’s potential global
role’ (EEAS 2015:20).
Conversely, the Commission, while also advocating
for the development of  a shared European Security
Agenda on Security between the Union and Member
States, places more emphasis on forging ‘a global
perspective with security as one of  our main
external priorities’ (COM (2015) 185: 20). At the
same time, likewise the Council and the EEAS, it
prioritises the reconfiguration of  the EU instruments
and policies, rather than developing a full
understanding of  the external environment, eg by
way of  defining the meaning and objectives of  a
partnership-building approach.
The European Parliament, in turn, believes, that the
main priorities should lie in developing mechanisms
of  legitimising security strategy (via EU Security
Consultative Forum) and establishing performance
indicators for key EU instruments (including
benchmarks and road-mapping, and their regular
monitoring) (PE557.263v01-00).
In summary, while there is an understanding of  the
need to develop a joined-up approach to security
which would synergise its external and internal
dimensions, and would define common priorities to
advance the EU’s global potential, there is a limited
inter-institutional vision for the shared agenda and for
the need to develop a more ‘outside-in’ perspective –
via strategic partnerships and joint interests.
2 Institutional architecture and
capabilities: tensions and
opportunities
Stemming from the above, there are also a number
of  tensions emerging from the envisaged
institutional operationalisation of  the forthcoming
European Security Model.
4 For detailed discussion see Korosteleva, E (2014) The EU and its
Eastern Neighbours: Towards a more Ambitious Partnership?
Routledge
5 Interview with a senior official, DG RELEX, College of  Europe,
6 September 2010
6 This has been especially noted and openly resisted by Chinese
and Russian officials. For more details see Korosteleva (2014)
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Relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are
generally conducted in an amicable way, and co-
operation is overall strong, in particular in the field of
economy and (energy) trade. However, there are
significant tensions over two policy areas, namely
value promotion and the way the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is being addressed in bilateral relations.
In both cases, a main hindrance appears to be that
current policy-making mechanisms do not allow for
sufficient input from Azerbaijan, and that the
relationship is therefore not truly based on principles
of  partnership. Azerbaijan appears to be
increasingly denouncing this EU’s one-sided policy.
The Azerbaijani government has indicated that it
feels ‘not heard’ by Brussels, and that its own
national (security) concerns are not being taken
serious the EU (interviews with Azerbaijani
representatives, May 2015). There are signals that
the country is now re-considering certain aspects of
co-operation with the EU (see eg APA 2015).
In terms of  security this is problematic because
reduced co-operation with Azerbaijan may harm the
EU’s own security interests as well, and due to
limited input the EU might systematically miss out on
valuable information on the regional context that
Azerbaijan possesses.
With regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Azerbaijan has indicated that it wishes further
engagement from the EU in the conflict resolution
process, following disappointment in the OSCE
Minsk Group’s efforts (Babayev 2014). While the EU
is reluctant to become directly involved (Council
2010b: 2), it does not appear to communicate its
views and arguments clearly, and moreover,
Azerbaijan perceives that the EU upholds different
narratives on the matter in relations with Armenia.
This issue not only undermines the EU’s credibility
but also increases Azerbaijan’s frustration over the
matter – the government has indicated that it is
losing its patience and that it may undertake military
action in case the international community does not
intervene pro-actively. Again, allowing more input
from Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) would benefit
the case, and a strategy should be designed not
solely by the EU but together with all relevant actors.
Externalisation in this case refers not merely to ‘Smart
Borders’, but also to the increasing participation of
third countries in the management of EU external
borders, a particularly important tool in the EU’s
eastern neighbourhood. The externalisation of EU
border management through visa issuance (‘visa
diplomacy’) is, unlike in the case of consular
protection of EU citizens, about the prevention of
potential risks reaching the borders of the EU, by
managing migratory flows and security threats
beyond the borders of the Union. Rather than based
on exclusionary politics of fence-building, it acts as a
filter by incentivising local reform and capacity-
building through a managed but inclusionary process
of visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. The success
of such approach is highlighted in the low number of
illegal crossings on the eastern borders (Frontex
2015), and Moldova’s successful reforms in border
and migration management.
Recommendations
To consider the growing importance of  consular
affairs as a vital external aspect of  EU internal
security, highlighting the need for reciprocity between
the internal and external dimensions of  EU security
To utilise the new Council Directive on consular
protection (Council of  the EU; 2015/637) as an
opportunity to strengthen consular cooperation
between Member States on both inter-ministerial and
local level, and make a more strategic use of
existing structures on the European level, in
particular, the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism in
contingency planning
To explore the emerging ‘visa diplomacy’ in the EU’s
eastern neighbourhood, as an important instrument
of facilitating more ‘inclusive’ relations with our
immediate neighbours, and managing potential
security risks beyond the borders of the Union, which
relates to point 3 of general recommendations (p7).
Appendix 1: A case-study of the EU’s
role in Consular Affairs
Igor Merheim-Eyre
New external security threats and the process of
European integration have resulted in the
emergence of  new actors and practices, not
traditionally associated with the consular sphere,
including the protection of  EU citizens outside of  the
European Union (EU), and the issuance of
Schengen visa.
Over the past two decades Member States of  the
European Union have been developing a framework
within which a citizen in distress may seek assistance
from consular or diplomatic representatives of
another Member State if  their state is not represented
in a particular third country outside of  the Union.
The consular protection of  EU citizens can be linked
to a general shift within the EU towards ‘soft’ security
issues, such as man-made and natural disasters
(Merheim-Eyre 2014), but also on post-disaster
resilience (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams 2011).
Over the past two decades, EU Member States have
sought various way of  developing joint post-disaster
contingency planning both within and outside the
borders of  the EU. In this context, consular protection
of citizens takes place in the form of  evacuations,
immediate humanitarian or medical assistance
through EU-funded or individual Member States’
responses. While daily assistance to EU citizens in
areas such as loss of  passport or imprisonment
remains the most frequent consular tasks, post-
disaster response is an increasingly important part
of  local and national contingency planning.
Issuance of Schengen visa to non-EU citizens is
another consular dimension that has known a shift
towards growing competencies at the European level
and towards externalisation beyond the Union.
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7 EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_
ap_final_en.pdf  (p3).
8 EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan.
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_
final_en.pdf. (p9)
9 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries.
10 July 2009. http://www.osce.org/mg/51152
10 European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue. 2012.
Debriefing EU Mediators. Summary and Key Lessons from a
debriefing with former EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter
Semneby (p6)
Recommendations
The EU should focus its resources on its
neighbourhood, however, only on the basis of  a
differentiated approach: countries such as
Azerbaijan have no need for financial support,
however they may appreciate political and security
support – which should also become available
outside of  the policy frameworks currently on offer
(notably the AA and membership). Since Azerbaijan
is not interested in EU membership or integration,
enlargement is no useful tool in these relations and
more diverse and effective instruments for co-
operation should be made available.
Equal input from partner states is essential: these
partner states hold crucial information about the
situation in the region (national governments as well
as civil society and experts). Moreover, without an
equal input and acknowledgement of  national
security interests, partner states may lose interest in
in-depth cooperation with the EU. Therefore, the
review of  the ESS should indeed pay more attention
to the operational plans as well as resourcing and
allocate a strong role for partners in this process.
The capacity of  the EEAS in Brussels should be
increased, to enable thorough processing of  policy
input coming from both the EU Delegation in
Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijani actors including
civil society organisations and the national
government. Because of  its in-depth knowledge and
close cooperation with the local government, the EU
Delegation should also obtain a greater role in the
design of  the policies vis- à-vis Azerbaijan.
To prevent losing credibility or partners’ confidence,
the EU should pay more close consideration to the
country’s national security priorities, notably the
resolution of  the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While
the EU may not want to get actively involved in the
conflict mediation, what is very important at this
point is clarity about the Union’s policy, towards
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, which underscores
points 2 and 3 of  the recommendations (p7).
Appendix 3: A case-study of the frozen
conflicts in the post-Soviet space
Irena Mnatsakanyan
The unresolved conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh
(NK), Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have the
potential to become the next unavoidable wars in
the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, with a spill-over
effect for the wider Europe. So far the EU’s
response and engagement with frozen conflicts on
the post-soviet space have been limited. Its major
achievements included appointing an EU Special
Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and
developing regional cooperation under the ENP/EaP
to positively contribute to conflict resolution. At the
same time, the practice reveals much inconsistency
and ineffectiveness in the EU security approach
towards these specific conflicts, which however
enjoy much similarity in terms of  their geographic
proximity to the EU, geopolitical environment,
historical roots and dynamics of  conflict escalation.
While the EU remains the biggest international
donor supporting post-conflict rehabilitation in the
conflict regions of  Abkhazia and South Ossetia
(Astrov 2011:87) for the past ten years, in the NK’s
case it did not manage to establish direct
engagement in the region.So far, none of  the EU
representatives managed to visit NK and there have
been no needs-assessment or fact finding missions
there. Furthermore, EU Action Plans (APs) for
Armenia and Azerbaijan include two contradictory
principles: ‘territorial integrity’ for Azerbaijan, and
the ‘right of  nations for self-determination’ for
Armenia (Kuzmicheva 2011). Additionally, in the
Azeri AP the NK resolution is number one priority,7
while in the Armenian AP it is number seven8.
It is believed that more internal inter-institutional
coherence for the development of  the EGSS is
necessary, as well as greater awareness of  other
geopolitical players in the region.
Recommendations for improving internal
coherence
• The EU should eliminate inconsistency between
the two ENP APs for Armenia and Azerbaijan, and
include unconditional support to the OSCE
proposed peace plan based on Madrid
Principles9
• It is necessary to improve coordination between
the activities of  the Council and the Commission
not only at the policy planning stage, but also at
the implementation stage. The inter-institutional
division of  policy responsibilities within the EU
mainly between the Commission and Council is
highly fragmented (Wolf  2007:4)
• One of the most crucial issues is to increase
cooperation between the actors in Brussels
(Commission, EEAS) and in-country officials
(EUSR, EU Delegations) during the implementation
of the EU crisis management activities.10
Recommendations for improving external
coherence:
• Considering the recognition of  Kosovo by most
EU member states, and the EU engagement in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is essential that
the EU directly engage in N-K in the form of
financial and humanitarian support, de-mining
activities, and fact finding missions is significant.
• The EU cooperation with Russia is an essential
factor. Russia’s politicization of  frozen conflicts
has led some Russia-friendly EU member states
to withdraw from supporting a more active EU
engagement in the frozen conflicts. Hence, a
more uniform position is needed, to develop a
coherent security policy towards these conflicts
• There is a need to increase EU cooperation with
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU’s performance in
the frozen conflicts also depends on the local
demand from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
for its involvement in the frozen conflicts. In the
conflicts where there was high local demand, the
EU involvement was significant. Compared with
Georgia, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan enjoys
very close relations with the EU, and hence the
local demand for the EU’s greater involvement in
NK is limited.
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